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Abstract–The BGO calorimeter, which provides a wide 
measurement range of the primary cosmic ray spectrum, is a key 
sub-detector of Dark Matter Particle Explorer (DAMPE). The 
readout electronics of calorimeter consists of 16 pieces of Actel 
ProASIC Plus FLASH-based FPGA, of which the design-level 
flip-flops and embedded block RAMs are single event upset (SEU) 
sensitive in the harsh space environment. Therefore to comply 
with radiation hardness assurance (RHA), SEU mitigation 
methods, including partial triple modular redundancy (TMR), 
CRC checksum, and multi-domain reset are analyzed and tested 
by the heavy-ion beam test. Composed of multi-level redundancy, 
a FPGA design with the characteristics of SEU tolerance and low 
resource consumption is implemented for the readout electronics. 
 
Index Terms—FPGA, Mitigation, SEU 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Dark Matter Particle Explorer 
 
Fig. 1  DAMPE Detector Cross Section 
 
he Dark Matter Particle Explorer (DAMPE) is being 
constructed as a scientific satellite to search for the proof 
of the existence of Dark Matter in space. As shown in Fig. 1, 
the DAMPE consists of four sub-detectors: a plastic 
scintillator detector (PSD), a silicon tracker (STK), a BGO 
calorimeter (BGO) and a neutron detector (ND) [1], [2]. 
Besides, there is a trigger board providing trigger signal for 
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the four sub-detectors and a controlling computer in charge of 
controlling and corresponding with the four sub-detectors. As 
the satellite is designed to fly on a near-earth orbit with the 
altitude of 500km for more than 3 years, the radiation damage 
effects of semiconductor caused by high energy particles in 
space environment is one main threat to the reliability of the 
space electronics. 
The BGO calorimeter is in charge of observation of high-
energy electrons/positrons and gamma rays [3]. The readout 
electronics system of BGO consists of 16 front end electronics 
(FEE) boards. And on each of the FEE board, a FPGA works 
as the controlling chip, in charge of handling the command 
sent to the FEE, controlling the work status of other chips on 
the FEE board, acquiring, packaging and sending the scientific 
data and engineering parameter. A flash-based FPGA of Actel, 
ProASIC Plus (APA) is chosen as the BGO FEE controlling 
chip. 
 
B. PROASIC PLUS (APA) 
 
Fig. 2  Structure of APA FGPA 
 
The APA family which adopts 0.22um LVCMOS process 
with four layers of metal has abundant programmable resource 
such as logic tiles, global nets, embedded RAMs and I/Os, as 
shown in Fig. 2. And it uses a live-at-power-up ISP flash 
switch as its programming element [4]. 
In the switch, two transistors share the floating gate, which 
stores the programming information and the upset mechanism 
for a heavy ion is to discharge the floating gate by generating 
charge in the bottom and top oxides that diffuse to the floating 
gate. However, the amount of charge generated by an ion with 
linear energy transfer (LET) value of 37 MeV·cm2/mg is less 
than 1% of the total charge on a programmed floating gate [5]. 
Therefore the configuration unit is insensitive to SEE and the 
programming information storing in logic tiles and I/Os is 
unlikely to be changed when the chip works in space. 
T 
 However, experiments also show that the D Type Flip-Flop 
(DFF) configured from the logic tile and the embedded RAMs 
are sensitive to SEU. Test result shows that the SEU LET 
value for DFF is less than 3 MeV·cm2/mg and using this 
value CREME96 predicts that the SEU probability for the 
chip is about 6.8×10-7 bit-1·day-1 at the altitude of 500km [5], 
[6]. Considering that there are about 2500 memory units in the 
APA chip and one-bit error can cause software error or even 
infinite loop status, it is necessary to take some measures to 
mitigate SEU when ProASIC Plus device is used in space. 
II. SEU MITIGATION TECHNIQUES 
A. Triple Modular Redundancy 
 
Fig. 3  Structure of TMR 
 
The Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) technique is the 
most commonly adopted passive hardware redundancy 
technique achieving fault masking properties [7]. It uses three 
replicas for one memory cell and adds a voter that identifies 
the correct result among the three ones on the basis of a 
majority vote, as shown in Fig. 3. The technique may be 
applied at different levels, from the whole system to a single 
register.  
The TMR technique improve the reliability of system, but it 
cause some problems at the same time such as much more 
resource consumption, speed reduction, power increasing, 
hardness in placing and routing and so on. To achieve 
maximum SEU tolerance with appropriate engineering 
consumption, usually TMR is only used in key registers and 
RAMs. 
 
B. Error Detection and Correction 
Error detection and correction codes (EDAC) are often used 
to improve the reliability of data storage media. The general 
idea for achieving error detection and correction is to add 
some redundancy, and the redundancy is a fixed number of 
check bits, which are derived from the data bits by some 
deterministic algorithm. The error detection schemes include 
Parity bits, Hamming Code, Cyclic redundancy check and so 
on. 
III. SEU MITIGATION APPLIED IN FEE FPGA DESIGN 
A. Structure of FPGA of BGO FEE 
The FPGA of BGO FEE mainly consists of four parts: the 
scientific data acquisition part, the control part, the monitor 
part and the status manager part, as shown in Fig. 4. The 
scientific data acquisition part is in charge of communicating 
with the peripheral chips which are related to data acquisition, 
caching the data got from the peripheral devices, packaging 
the scientific data and sending the data package. The control 
part is in charge of receiving commands sent to FPGA, 
judging the validity of the command, executing the command 
and giving the response. These two parts which achieve the 
main function of FPGA take up about 78% resource of all 
logic consumption. 
For the control part, there is a command handling procedure 
which starts when receiving command and completes 
command analysis, executing and responding step by step. 
And for the scientific data acquisition part, there is a scientific 
data acquisition procedure which is triggered by the trigger 
signal from the trigger board and also consists of many steps. 
When a procedure finishes, the part of the logic is idle until 
next command or trigger signal comes. 
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Fig. 4  Structure of FPGA of BGO FEE 
 
B. Multi-Domain Reset and Multi-Level Reset 
As mentioned before, the logic has a command handling 
procedure and a scientific data acquisition procedure. In space, 
SEU can happen in any step of the procedure. And this may 
lead the control part or the scientific data acquisition part into 
an infinite loop status, at which the system can’t work 
normally and need to be reset. However, it is not necessary to 
reset the whole system if only parts of the logic are under 
infinite loop condition. Therefore, Multi-domain reset and 
Multi-level reset is adopted in FPGA design.  
  
Fig. 5  Multi-domain reset signal
 
As shown in Fig. 5, four reset signals are used in logic 
design including hw_rstn, soft_rstn, cmd_path_rstn and 
sci_path_rstn. Hw_rstn is the hardware reset signal which 
comes from the outside reset chip. It resets all registers and 
RAMs to their default and is used to initialize the FPGA when 
powering on. Soft_rstn comes from reset command and resets 
all registers and RAMs expect a shifter which is used in 
command reset. Cmd_path_rstn and sci_path_rstn is used to 
reset the control part and the scientific data acquisition part 
respectively. When a data acquisition process begins, a timer 
starts to count. If the data acquisition process doesn’t finish in 
a certain time because of SEU or something else, the 
sci_path_rstn actives and resets the scientific data acquisition 
part automatically. This is the principle of sci_path_rstn, and 
the principle of cmd_path_rstn is similar. These two reset 
signals prevent the system entering infinite loop status and 
guarantee that the SEU happening in the previous process 
doesn’t influence the next one. Besides, when the scientific 
data acquisition part and the control part are idle, the reset 
signals are active and set the two parts into sleep, which can 
effectively avoid the influence of SEU.  
 
C. TMR and CRC 
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Fig. 6  TMR structure of va_cfgreg 
 
As mentioned before, most of the registers in the logic 
belongs to the control part or the scientific data acquisition 
part and they are reset when the procedure is done. However, 
there’re some key registers and RAMs which are valid all the 
time and only respond to the global reset signal. Therefore 
TMR technique is used in vital registers and RAMs to make 
sure that the values in them are correct. 
Fig. 6 shows the TMR structure of va_cfgreg, which is one 
of the key registers in FPGA. In the structure, each replica is a 
DFF and the voter consists of combinational logic circuits. 
The input of each DFF is connected with a 2:1 multiplexer, 
which decides whether the outside signal or the voter result is 
the input of the DFF. When the register doesn’t need to be 
rewritten, the voter result is chosen as the inputs of the three 
DFFs and the values in them are refreshed by the voter result 
at each rising edge of clock signal. Therefore, if SEU 
happened in one DFF, the voter result which is decided by the 
majority of the three DFFs is still correct and the wrong value 
would be refreshed by the correct value immediately. 
To avoid that Mutiple Bit Upset (MBU) happens in two or 
three replicas of one TMR unit, before automatic placement 
and routing, three replicas are manually set in different 
physical areas. 
To make further efforts to ensure the correctness of the 
value in key registers, the values are monitored as engineering 
parameter all the time. However,  unlike the ones in registers, 
the data in RAMs are so many that they can’t be monitored in 
real-time. Therefore, the cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is 
adopted to automatically detect data corruption in RAMs. 
The CRC result is calculated before and attached at the end 
of the RAM. When the data in RAM is used, the CRC result is 
calculated again and compared with the one at the end of the 
RAM. The mismatch of the two CRC results shows the data 
corruption in RAM and an indicating bit is active 
automatically. The indicating bit is also monitored as 
engineering parameter and is used as a call for RAM 
reconfiguration. 
IV. TEST AND RESULTS 
After using these means in the logic design, an ion-beam 
testing is performed at the Heavy Ion Research Facility in 
Lanzhou (HIRFL) cyclotrons to evaluate to the SEU tolerance 
of FPGA logic, as shown in Fig. 7. 
  
Fig. 7  SEU Test Site 
 
A. Test Platform 
The test system consists of a host PC, a Master  Board and a 
DUT Board. A LabVIEW program works on the host PC to 
control the whole system and monitor the status of APA. The 
Master board which works in the environment without 
radiation is in charge of communicating with host computer 
and the DUT Board and powering up the DUT Board. The 
APA chip is placed on the DUT Board and only the DUT 
Board is placed under radiation condition to make sure that the 
system function well while APA is under radiation test. 
 
B. Irradiation Test with High LET Value 
The test is performed at HIRFL-TR5 terminal, using 
Bismuth ions. Irradiations are conducted in air, at ambient 
temperature, with heavy ions passing through a vacuum/air 
transition foil. By the means of changing the thickness of air, 
the LET value is adjusted to about 90 Mev·cm2/mg which is 
very high to chips used in space. An APA600 chip with 
removal of the package lid is configured with a simple logic 
and tested under the radiation condition. 
APA600 works under the irradiation for about 10 minutes 
and the total fluence reaches up to 8.4×106 ions/cm2. During 
this time, the supply current of FPGA is monitored and no 
abnormal current is found, which means no SEL happens in 
the experiment and the APA chips are insensitive to SEL. 
Besides, the FPGA works well during the experiment and no 
configuration damage is observed, which means the structure 
of flash switch in APA is immune to SEU and the 
configuration information in APA won’t be change when it 
works in space. The experiment results correspond with the 
research made by Gregory R. Allen and Gary M. Swift [5]. 
 
C. Functional Test 
Configured with a lite version of the whole system logic, 
APA300 is put on the condition with the LET value of 39.6 
MeV*cm2/mg and the ion flux of 100 ions/cm2/s. The 
experiment continues for about 25 minutes and the FPGA 
works with no mistakes. When receiving commands, the 
control part can handle it without error and the science data 
acquisition part also works well.  
Through the experiment, the three ways used in the logic 
design for SEU mitigation are proved to be effective and the 
mitigation techniques make sure that the APA chip can work 
in the space environment. 
V. DISCUSSION 
A. The Reliability of TMR with Correction 
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Fig. 8  Reliability Change with Time 
 
Using Markov model in fault-tolerant computing, a 
system’s reliability can be predict [8]. Fig. 8 shows reliability 
change of three structures with time. Compared with the one 
of TMR DFF without correction and signal DFF, the 
reliability of TMR DFF almost doesn’t change with time and 
still very close to 1 at 30000 hours later. Therefore, the 
structure of TMR with correction can highly improve the 
reliability of a register. 
 
B. The Reliability of the Ion Test 
According to the test results, the SEU LET for APA chip is 
about 3 MeV·cm2/mg [5], and at the attitude of 500km, the 
flux at this LET value is less than 0.5 ions/cm2/s [6]. 
Compared with the flux of 100 ions/cm2/s in test environment 
at HIRFL-TR5, the flux in the space environment is very low. 
Besides, as discussed above, due to the write-back line in the 
TMR structure, the SEU error won’t accumulate by time. 
Therefore, the ion test simulates a much harsh condition and 
verifies that the FPGA logic with SEU mitigation techniques 
has the ability of SEU tolerance in the space environment. 
 
C. Resource Consumption and Performance Reduction 
The methods of SEU mitigation have efficiently declined 
the sensitivity to SEU of FPGA. However, as mentioned 
before, resource consumption and speed degradation also need 
to be considered when logic hardening techniques are used. 
Table I shows comparison of the logic tile consumption, 
highest work frequency and power between the logic with 
 hardening techniques and the one without hardening 
techniques. From the table we can see that due to the SEU 
mitigation design, the logic tile increases from 57.1% to 77.0% 
which is still very low, and the highest work frequency 
declines to 33.2 MHz which also meets the requirements of 
design. The power, which increases from 124.1 mW to 153.8 
mW, will not cause a problem either. Therefore, not only the 
techniques used in the logic design mitigate SEU effectively 
but also the resources they consume is acceptable. 
 
TABLE I 
COMPARISON OF LOGIC WITH AND WITHOUT HARDENING 
 
Logic 
Tile/% 
Highest 
Frequency/MHz 
Power/mW 
With Hardening 
Techniques 
57.1 44.1 124.1 
Without Hardening 
Techniques 
77.0 33.2 153.8 
VI. CONCLUSION 
In order to enable the APA to function well in the space 
radiation environment for DAMPE, SEU mitigation 
techniques are used in the logic. The SEU mitigation means 
include TMR, CRC and Multi-domain reset. After logic 
hardening, an ion-beam experiment is carried out and it proves 
that the SEU mitigation techniques are effective and the FPGA 
after logic reinforcement works under the condition with 
radiation with no mistakes. 
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